RIP Dennis Lane

I knew Dennis Lane only slightly: I occasionally commented on his blog, he commented on mine once or twice, and I met and talked to him several times at Howard County blogger meetups and other events. I can’t speak to his life as a private person and how he came to a violent end, and even if I could I wouldn’t: I don’t blog about my own private and family life, and won’t do so about others. However I did want to say a few words to mark his death.

What I admired most about Dennis as a blogger was his ability to write frequently and seemingly extemporaneously on a variety of topics: local politics, real estate and business affairs, and just the normal goings-on of daily life. He mentioned recently that he hadn’t had time to blog as much as normal, but (as I commented on the post), even his “infrequent” blogging way outpaced my own truly infrequent offerings. I also enjoyed reading his Business Monthly columns, whenever I picked up a copy at a local establishment; it was one of the few things I read on paper rather than online. Leaving aside all his other contributions to Howard County, he’ll be sorely missed in the local blogging community, of which he was a founder and guiding light.

A couple of other points: In 2012 four people were murdered in Howard County and I was acquainted with two of them, Mary-Marguerite Kohn and Brenda Brewington, who were shot at St Peters Episcopal Church in Ellicott City almost exactly a year ago. This year I think there have been two homicides in Howard County thus far, and I’m acquainted with one of the victims. Strange that in a placid suburban county of 300,000 violent death should so disproportionately strike people I know.

FInally, it’s fitting that I first learned of Dennis’s death while reading a blog post, in this case by TJ Mayotte. It’s a measure of how much I rely on local blogs and hyper-local sites like Ellicott City Patch and Explore Howard for my knowledge of Howard County affairs. I guess one way to honor Dennis and what he meant to our local online community is to get off my rear end and blog some more myself.

The long game in Columbia

One political faction obtains a solid majority and uses it to push through a far-reaching initiative, only to have their dominance threatened in a subsequent election marked by newly-energized opposition and relatively low turnout. The 2010 mid-term victories of the Republican party? No, it’s the “Pioneers strike back” victories in the just-concluded elections for the Columbia Association Board of Directors.

Tom Coale has already done a good wrap-up, so I’ll confine myself to a couple of thoughts continuing the analogy above. First, what I’ll call the “anti-Arbor” faction faces a decision on strategy similar to that of the anti-Obamacare GOP post-2010: They apparently don’t have the votes to reverse the decision outright, so they face a choice between trying to shape the Inner Arbor plan more to their liking, making compromises where they can find them, or throwing sand in the gears of CA governance to try to delay things until they can re-take a board majority and kill the plan then.

I have no idea which strategy they’ll choose, and in one sense I don’t care—they’ll do what they want to do regardless of what I think. I’m more concerned about the strategy of those who favor the Inner Arbor plan and the accompanying 21st century redevelopment of Columbia. In a recent post unsuccessful candidate Julia McCready rues the “sliminess” in the electoral process. I understand her being upset, especially about untruths allegedly spread by the incumbent. Tom Coale also writes of “blatant and intentional lies” from Inner Arbor opponents. Going back to the GOP analogy, it sounds like someone’s been exercising their inner Karl Rove (or Lee Atwater, to use an example for an older generation). However I think the operative advice here is, “Don’t get mad, get even.”

How to do that? In another post Julia looks to the passing of the Pioneer generation: “… none of us are immortal. The time will come when those in power are gone.” Unfortunately I think this is like the Democratic party looking to demographic change for its salvation. Consider that even 70-ish Inner Arbor opponents can expect to live another 16 years or so if male, and almost 19 years if female, and they may attract younger proteges and supporters in the meantime. Waiting in and of itself is not going to win the day.

What will? I think Tom Coale has the right idea: “forward-thinking candidates” are going to have to build their own networks of dedicated supporters, people who will turn out reliably to testify at CA board meetings and vote in CA and village board elections. This will require not just online activism but old-fashioned offline relationship building and dues-paying, not just for a year or two leading up to the next CA elections but for the long term.

Which leaves me with a final question: Are there enough competent and energetic people who have the patience and stamina for that, especially in an era when Columbia is no longer the “new city upon a hill” but a suburb much like any other? The Columbia Pioneers have spent over thirty years promoting their vision of Columbia; is the next generation of Columbians prepared to spend the next thirty years promoting theirs?

What good is economic freedom (as measured by the Mercatus Center)?

Recently the Mercatus Center at George Mason University released its latest “Freedom in the 50 States” index ranking U.S. states by their overall levels of personal and economic freedom. I happened to see it via a post on the Bleeding Heart Libertarians blog, but it’s been referenced in a number of places. I won’t rehash the comments of others, many of which criticize the way the various types of freedom are measured. Rather I had a somewhat different question, namely whether the measures of freedom in this report, particularly those for economic freedom, actually tell us anything useful.

The blog post announcing the new edition of the index claims that “regulatory freedom in particular is associated with states‘ growth in personal income”, but that analysis is apparently part of the full book-length edition not yet released. In the meantime I’m interested in a separate question at the heart of the Bleeding Heart Libertarians project, namely whether increased economic freedom makes a positive difference to the poorest members of society, as BHLers suggest, or whether “economic freedom” is really just a code word for policies that benefit the rich at the expense of the poor, as many progressives suggest. The folks at the Mercatus Center were nice enough to release the data on which the rankings are based, so I can use that data to start exploring the question.

I should stop here and note that there are people far more competent than me to do this sort of analysis; however I think it’s important not to be intimidated by issues involving numbers and statistics, and I encourage others to take the same attitude. In support of my novice attempt I’ve created a Google spreadsheet containing the following variables of interest: the Mercatus Center values for economic freedom, fiscal freedom, and regulatory freedom for each of the 50 states in 2009 and 2011, and the percentage of people in each state participating in the Supplement Nutrition Assistance Program (“food stamps”) in December of 2009 and 2011.1

I’m choosing SNAP participation as a proxy for poverty because ensuring people have enough to eat would presumably be a goal of any social safety net, no matter how basic. I would include SNAP participation rates for 2007 as well, but my source for the SNAP data doesn’t have percentage figures for that year and I’m too lazy to do the calculations myself.

I’ll assume for the sake of argument that libertarians are correct, and that increased economic freedom should reduce the number of people poor enough that they need food stamps. This might occur in multiple ways: greater economic freedom could produce general prosperity that raises the prospects of the poor as well; some economic freedoms, such as the reduction or elimination of occupation licensing restrictions, could benefit poor people specifically; and greater economic freedom might reduce the extent to which government “crowds out” private initiatives, so that people get fed via charities or support from their extended families and have less need to apply for SNAP.

Now for the analysis of this hypothesis: If you want to follow along at home, download the R statistical package in your preferred version (for WIndows, Mac, or Linux) and install it, and then download my data in comma separated value (CSV) format suitable for loading into R. Start R, go to the directory where you downloaded the data file (in my case /Users/hecker/Downloads on my Mac), and load the data into the variable fs (a “data frame” in R-speak):

> setwd("/Users/hecker/Downloads")
> fs <- read.table("freedom-snap.csv", sep=",", header=TRUE)
> fs
state st econfree2009 regfree2009 fiscfree2009 snappct200912
1         Alabama AL      24.9388     -7.4383       32.377          16.8
2          Alaska AK      -4.8841      8.9700      -13.854          10.2
3         Arizona AZ      14.6838      9.5361        5.148          15.2
...

(The sep="," parameter tells R that this is a CSV file, and the header=TRUE parameter tells R to use the text fields in the first line of the file as names for the columns.)

As a first step in the analysis I’ll use the plot() function to plot the values of fs$snappct201112 (the percentage of the population in each state receiving food stamps in December 2011) against the values of fs$econfree2011 (the Mercatus economic freedom value for each state in 2011):

> plot(fs$econfree2011,fs$snappct201112)
>

R can generate very professional-looking plots but in this case I don’t need the frills, just the following simple but nonetheless useful scatter plot:

snappct-vs-econfree-2011

(If you’d like you can click on the graph to see a larger version.)

At least at first glance there doesn’t appear to be any relationship between the level of economic freedom in each state and the percentage of that state’s population poor enough to be using food stamps. But I have a powerful statistical package at my service, so I’ll do a little more work. In particular, I can compute the correlation coefficient between economic freedom and SNAP participation, a measure of how the two variables are linearly related:

> cor(fs$econfree2011,fs$snappct201112)
[1] 0.03106044
>

Perfect positive correlation would correspond to a correlation coefficient of 1.0; in that case SNAP participation, and thus presumably poverty, would directly increase as economic freedom increases. Perfect negative correlation would correspond to a correlation coefficient of -1.0; in that case SNAP participation, and thus presumably poverty, would directly decrease as economic freedom increases. But in this case the correlation coefficient at 0.031 is very close to zero, so my initial conclusion is that economic freedom, at least as measured by the Mercatus Center, doesn’t appear to make a difference either way.

What about if I measure the correlations with regulatory freedom and fiscal freedom respectively? Here are the results for those calculations:

> cor(fs$regfree2011,fs$snappct201112)
[1] -0.2284056
> cor(fs$fiscfree2011,fs$snappct201112)
[1] 0.1714178
>

Now I see some correlation, although it’s relatively weak: increased regulatory freedom is associated with slightly decreased SNAP participation (slightly less poverty), while increased fiscal freedom is associated with slightly increased SNAP participation (slightly more poverty). Since economic freedom is calculated as the sum of fiscal freedom and regulatory freedom, these effects (if they actually exist) cancel each other out when considering the effects of economic freedom as a whole.

Are the correlations with regulatory freedom and fiscal freedom really significant? There are statistical techniques that can address that question, but I’m not well-versed enough in statistics to do a good job of investigating it. Instead I can get a feel for how fuzzy these correlations are by creating scatter plots as I did with economic freedom above. This time I’ll get a little fancier and put real x and y axis labels on the graph, and use the two-letter state codes to label the points instead of using circles:

> plot(fs$regfree2011,fs$snappct201112,xlab="Regulatory Freedom (2011)",
+   ylab="SNAP Participation Percentage (Dec 2011)",pch=NA_integer_)
> text(fs$regfree2011,fs$snappct201112,labels=fs$st)
>

(The parameter pch=NA_integer_ causes the points to be initially plotted without any symbols displayed, and then the labels=fs$st parameter to the text() function causes the state codes to be plotted where the symbols would normally go.)

Here’s the resulting graph for SNAP participation percentages vs. regulatory freedom:

snappct-vs-regfree-2011

It looks as if there’s a slight tendency for states with greater regulatory freedom to have fewer people on food stamps, but still the data are all over the map in general.

I’ll do the same sort of graph for fiscal freedom:

> plot(fs$fiscfree2011,fs$snappct201112,xlab="Fiscal Freedom (2011)",
+   ylab="SNAP Participation Percentage (Dec 2011)",pch=NA_integer_)
> text(fs$fiscfree2011,fs$snappct201112,labels=fs$st)
>

snappct-vs-fiscfree-2011

Here any correlation is even harder to discern, though if I squint I can see a very slight tendency for states with greater fiscal freedom to have higher rates of SNAP participation.

I can also get a feel for how real these correlations are by looking at data for other years. In this case the only other data I have is for 2009; rather than plot it I’ll go straight to the correlation coefficients:

> cor(fs$econfree2009,fs$snappct200912)
[1] 0.02359412
> cor(fs$regfree2009,fs$snappct200912)
[1] -0.129513
> cor(fs$fiscfree2009,fs$snappct200912)
[1] 0.1000464
>

The correlations here are even smaller than those for 2011, at just over half the size. If I looked at the 2009 data first I’d be inclined to say that there’s almost no correlation at all between regulatory freedom and SNAP participation, and ditto for fiscal freedom. As before, the correlation of SNAP participation with economic freedom (the sum of the two other freedoms) is essentially zero.

To conclude, we have an index of economic freedom that was created through a fairly sophisticated process by an organization motivated to do a good job of it, given its goal to promote the benefits of free markets. And yet according to its own measures increasing the level of economic freedom in a given state seems to produce little if any improvement in the plight of the poor in that state, at least based on one plausible measure of poverty. On the other hand, progressives may be disconcerted as well: the sorts of policies advocated by free market think tanks under the banner of “economic freedom” don’t seem to be making poverty worse either.

Maybe I chose the wrong measure of poverty, or perhaps my amateur analysis is flawed in some other way. What’s the real story? Does economic freedom as measured by the Mercatus Center actually help the poor or not? I’ll leave the task of producing a final answer to that question to wiser heads than mine.

UPDATE: I replaced an incorrect image for the first scatter plot (SNAP participation vs. economic freedom for 2011) with the correct one.

UPDATE 2: I added the line to read the data into a data frame; for some reason this got garbled in the original post.


1. The values for economic freedom, regulatory freedom, and fiscal freedom in 2009 are from rows 239, 237, and 13 respectively and columns BB through CY inclusive in the 2007-2011 sheet in the “Freedom in the 50 States” data spreadsheet [XLS]; the values for 2011 are from the same rows, columns CZ through EW inclusive. (Note that the economic freedom values are calculated in the spreadsheet as the sum of the fiscal freedom and regulatory freedom values.)

The values for SNAP participation for 2009 are from the table “Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Persons participating as share of the population” on page 4 of the December 2009 SNAP participation tables [PDF], part of the 2009 SNAP data published by the Food Research and Action Center. The corresponding values for 2011 are from the table ”Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Share of population participating” on page 4 of the December 2011 SNAP participation tables [PDF], linked to from the 2011 and 2012 SNAP data page on the same site.

Weekend reading: Wealth and politics

Here’s another in an intermittent series of posts on articles I found interesting; this one focuses on issues related to wealth, politics, and how they interact in various ways.

  • Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans” (Benjamin I. Page, Larry M. Bartels, and Jason Seawright). An intriguing glimpse into the political preferences of the 1% and above, based on a survey of wealthy individuals in the Chicago area. The results reinforce stereotypes for the most part: Compared to Americans in general, the wealthy put a higher priority on reducing budget deficits, and favor cutting social spending like Social Security, reducing regulations on business, lowering taxes, and so on; they are less supportive of public education and taxpayer-funded national health insurance. However they are in fact concerned about levels of economic inequality and supportive of better wages for lower income Americans, they just don’t believe government can or should do anything about this. The authors conclude: “On many important issues the preferences of the wealthy appear to differ markedly from those of the general public. Thus, if policy makers do weigh citizens’ policy preferences differentially based on their income or wealth, the result will not only significantly violate democratic ideals of political equality, but will also affect the substantive contours of American public policy.” (Note that I found this paper via a post on the political science blog The Monkey Cage.)
  • Why the Rich Don’t Give to Charity (Ken Stern). Summarizes some studies on charitable giving by the wealthy: The bottom 20% by income give at a rate more than double that of the top 20% by income, despite receiving little or no tax benefits from charitable giving. Wealthy people also give relatively more to universities, arts organizations, and the like: “Of the 50 largest individual gifts to public charities in 2012, … [not] a single one … went to a social-service organization or to a charity that principally serves the poor and the dispossessed.” This not necessarily a function of the wealthy being more stingy or less empathetic by nature; some of the difference appears to be driven by the wealthy not having close exposure to the problems of those at the lower end of the income scale: “Wealthy people who lived in homogeneously affluent areas … were less generous than comparably wealthy people who lived in more socioeconomically diverse surroundings. It seems that insulation from people in need may dampen the charitable impulse.” (Note that Stern has written a book on U.S. charities, With Charity for All: Why Charities Are Failing and a Better Way to Give. See also my past post on the question of balancing charitable giving with perceived need.)
  • Is Capitalism Moral” (Steven Pearlstein). The core thesis: The recent financial crisis and long-tern trends in income, employment, etc., “are forcing free-market advocates and their allies in the Republican Party to pursue a new strategy. Instead of arguing that free markets are good for you, they’re saying that they’re good—mounting a moral defense of free-market capitalism.” Although it’s an opinion piece, the article is somewhat in the “view from nowhere” mode of critiquing arguments on both sides of the question and urging advocates to do better. Pearlstein’s conclusion: “In our current debate over capitalism, too much attention is focused on whether, how or how much to redistribute the incomes that markets have produced, with too little focus on the institutional arrangements that determine how that income is divided up in the first place.”
  • The Administrative State vs. the Social Insurance State (Jason Brennan). Speaking of institutional arrangements, here’s what seems to be an emerging theme among some people libertarian by nature but also sensitive to considerations of social justice: “We could imagine a political-economic regime in which there is a completely or largely unregulated free market but in which the government taxes people to provide social insurance and some other welfare benefits. On its face, this regime seem much congenial to classical liberalism than a regime that provides no welfare benefits, but which regulates most enterprises, sets prices, controls entry into markets, and imposes licensing rules.” Real-world examples cited include Canada, Denmark, and others that have European-style social welfare and insurance systems but score better than the U.S. on many measures of economic freedom.
  • Return of the Oppressed” (Peter Turchin). A physicist turned social scientist and advocate of “cliodynamics” looks at the history of economic inequality in the U.S. and elsewhere, and sees it being driven by long-term cycles: “Upward trends in variables (for example, economic inequality) alternate with downward trends. And most importantly, the ways in which other parts of the system move can tell us why certain trends periodically reverse themselves. … Unequal societies generally turn a corner once they have passed through a long spell of political instability. Governing elites … realise that they need to … switch to a more co-operative way of governing, if they are to have any hope of preserving the social order.” Turchin sees the present trend in economic inequality peaking around 2020, along with other trends relating to political and social stability: “In other words, we are rapidly approaching a historical cusp, at which the U.S. will be particularly vulnerable to violent upheaval.”

I usually just post these articles with a minimum of editorial comment, but this time I thought it was worth adding a few of my own thoughts:

The political attitudes of the wealthy as surveyed by Page, et.al., match up pretty closely from what you might conclude reading Wall Street Journal editorials and Heritage Foundation think pieces, or just listening to Mitt Romney’s infamous “47%” remarks. Thinking along Peter Turchin’s lines, it’s easy to see how this could be a self-reinforcing tendency: As more and more income flows to top earners, they will bear an increasingly greater share of the tax burden, and that in turn will lessen their willingness to support government spending on benefits for the poor and middle-class. At the same time the growing social, economic, and geographical isolation of the wealthy will likely lessen support for charitable giving directed at the poor, at least those in the U.S., whom many see as having it pretty good compared to the rest of the world.

As Pearlstein notes, this will all be accompanied by renewed debate over the moral foundations of capitalism. The second half of the 20th century saw a revival of classic liberal and libertarian political philosophy (e.g., by Friedrich Hayek, Robert Nozick, and—in a more idiosyncratic way—Ayn Rand). This was followed by the revival of free-market politics in the U.S. and elsewhere, with Barry Goldwater as the harbinger and Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher as the realization, with the last 30 years seeing the working out of the resulting policies. The “bleeding heart libertarian” school of political philosophers, and the idea of promoting the “social insurance state” at the expense of the ”administrative state”, can be seen as an attempt to rework classic liberal and libertarian thought in the face of economic trends that might weaken popular support for the current economic system.

Given structural factors at work in U.S. politics, including the out-sized influence of small states seen in the Senate and the combination of gerrymandering and geographical clustering by party affecting the composition of the House of Representatives, I don’t see any major political shifts happening in the near term. Whether 2020 will mark a turning point, as Peter Turchin thinks, is an open question.

Thoughts on market democracy, part 1: Capitalistic economic freedoms as vital aspects of liberty

This is part 1 of a projected four-part series, which I hope to continue in part 2, part 3, and part 4.

A while back I read the essays in the online symposium on John Tomasi’s book Free Market Fairness at the Bleeding Heart Libertarians group blog. I’ve previously noted why I think the book and its topic are important. But what exactly is “free market fairness”? It is Tomasi’s particular take on a broader concept he calls “market democracy”:

Market democracy is a deliberative form of liberalism that is sensitive to the moral insights of libertarianism. Market democracy combines … four ideas …: (1) capitalistic economic freedoms as vital aspects of liberty, (2) society as a spontaneous order, (3) just and legitimate political institutions as acceptable to all who make their lives among them, and (4) social justice as the ultimate standard of political evaluation. (p. xv)

This paragraph packs a lot into a few words. In this series of blog posts I’ll give my personal thoughts on the idea of market democracy, not as a professional (or even amateur) philosopher or economist, but simply as someone who is interested in this general line of thought and somewhat sympathetic to it. Do not expect sophisticated arguments or penetrating insights; I have many questions and few answers.

The first sentence of the above paragraph situates Tomasi’s project in the general history and taxonomy of political philosophy. The main point of interest to non-philosophers is that there’s actually a common intellectual heritage between political “liberals” in the U.S. sense (i.e., those generally supportive of government and its associated regulatory and redistribution schemes) and those who oppose them and call for less government and freer markets. Tomasi’s goal is to draw upon that common heritage and create a hybrid philosophy that acknowledges the importance of the free market but does not dismiss the concerns of those concerned with “social justice” in the general sense. The first two ideas of market democracy come out of the “classic liberal” and libertarian traditions, and the second two from the “modern” or “high liberal” tradition.

Let’s start with the first component of Tomasi’s concept of market democracy, “capitalistic economic freedoms as vital aspects of liberty”. By this Tomasi means that the freedom to engage in typical capitalist activities—owning private property (including the “means of production”), starting a business, producing products and services and selling them in the market, accumulating wealth as a reward for one’s efforts—should be thought of as equally important as other freedoms, for example the freedom to freely speak one’s mind, to practice a religion (or not worship at all), and so on.

Tomasi and others have crafted sophisticated philosophical arguments as to why economic freedom should be viewed as equally important as freedom of speech, religion, etc. Tomasi in particular sees economic freedom as necessary to support “responsible self-authorship”:

A just society is one whose institutions respect citizens from every social class as free and equal self-governing agents. Market democracy affirms a thick conception of economic freedom … as a requirement stemming from its foundational commitment to respect persons as free and equal moral agents: responsible self-authors must be free to make a wide range of decisions in the economic domains of their lives. …

To restrict the capacity of people to make economic choices or, worse, to treat their economic activities merely as a means to the social ends of others, would violate the dignity of such persons and so would be to treat them unjustly. (p. 97-98)

Others have created equally sophisticated arguments as to why economic freedoms really aren’t basic. I’m not equipped to adequately evaluate and critique all the philosophical arguments. However I do have some questions as to whether or not most people in practice would see economic freedoms as basic, and thus would treat perceived violations of those freedoms as a moral wrong comparable to violations of other freedoms.

Here I follow the theory of “moral foundations” formulated by Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues, that “several innate and universally available psychological systems are the foundations of ‘intuitive ethics’”, that people are genetically and culturally predisposed to weight these factors in different ways, and that these different weightings are associated with the “conservative” vs. (modern) “liberal” divide we see in politics. Stated in these terms the overall theory seems plausible to me, even if Haidt and colleagues haven’t (yet) got all the details right.

One of the claimed moral foundations is liberty/oppression, associated with the “feelings of reactance and resentment people feel toward those who dominate them and restrict their liberty”. Ravi Iyer, Haidt, and colleagues recently published research claiming that libertarians form a distinct group from liberals and conservatives in their weighting the liberty/harm moral foundation as of high importance, and weighting other moral foundations low in comparison. Libertarians also show up as a coherent group expressing similar sentiments in other survey-based categorizations such as the Pew Research Political Typology. Clearly we can expect libertarians to value economic freedom and to treat it as a basic freedom. But what about other people?

One way to approach this question is to look at extreme cases in which economic freedoms are egregiously violated. Consider for example the Arab Spring, which most people now think of (if they think of it at all) as a straightforward struggle of people for democracy and against dictatorship, now potentially hijacked by Islamists seeking to translate religious belief into political power. But the original spark of the Arab Spring had nothing to do with promoting democracy or Islam. It was the anger and frustration of Mohamed Bouazizi, “a Tunisian street vendor who set himself on fire on 17 December 2010, in protest of the confiscation of his wares and the harassment and humiliation that he reported was inflicted on him by a municipal official and her aides”. While some of the details of Bouazizi’s story remain fuzzy (was street vending actually illegal, or just obstructed by corrupt police officers in search of bribes? did the official actually slap Bouazizi or not?), there’s no doubt that the root of Bouazizi’s protest was his need and desire to provide for his family through commercial trade, and the perceived obstruction of that quest by agents of the state.

The people of Tunisia responded to Mohamed Bouazizi’s act with protests of their own, which in turn inspired protests in other countries. While the motivations of the protestors differed, a common theme was anger at governments that did not provide economic opportunities for the people subject to their rule. Bouazizi’s story arguably affected the protestors in the same general way that the death of religious martyrs or attacks on civil rights protesters have affected others. Perhaps people see the situations as morally equivalent in some deep way, and perhaps this felt sense of moral equivalence indicates that we should indeed treat economic freedom as equal in importance to other freedoms whose violations we view as morally wrong.

However I think the situation is more complicated than that, because it’s possible that the strong reaction to Bouazizi’s act was based on its invoking multiple moral foundations simultaneously. People might feel outraged because the state committed an act of aggression against him, taking his goods and preventing him from selling them (liberty/oppression moral foundation). However the outrage might also be because the state’s action resulted in Bouazizi not being able to provide for himself and his family (care/harm moral foundation), or because it prevented Bouazizi from reaping the rewards that his work might have earned him in other circumstances (cheating/fairness foundation, with an emphasis on fairness as proportionality of rewards). It’s also possible that the fact that Bouazizi was (allegedly) slapped by a woman added to the outrage felt by those in the male-dominated traditional societies of the Arab world (sanctity/degradation foundation).

One way to unravel this is to imagine hypothetical scenarios in which the effect of the other moral foundations is removed or altered. For example, suppose Mohamed Bouazizi were a prosperous merchant who already owned several successful produce trucks, so that the state’s actions might have mildly impacted his income but not fundamentally threatened his well-being and that of his family. Would thus lessening the relevance of the care/harm foundation decrease the sympathy others would have for Bouazizi and the outrage they might feel? Or suppose that Tunisia’s government were widely perceived as legitimate and its police force free of corruption, and the state’s actions against Bouazizi were based on his violating anti-street vending ordinances that had been duly considered and passed by a democratically-elected legislature. Would some people now see Bouazizi himself as in violation of moral norms, namely those related to the authority/subversion foundation?

The problem here, at least for me, is that a philosophical argument that a freedom is basic (and thus deserving of special protection) will ultimately stand or fall in the world at large on the degree to which a claimed violation of that freedom can be perceived as a moral wrong by the mass of people operating from their different weightings of the various moral foundations. An act that violates all or most of the moral foundations would likely never be seen as moral, while an act that violates none or at most one of the moral foundations could be seen as morally neutral by most of the population. Since different people weight the various moral foundations differently, and since only a small fraction of the population appears to treat the liberty/oppression foundation as primary, I suspect people are inevitably going to disagree on the extent to which restrictions on economic freedom constitute a moral wrong, and hence on whether economic freedom is seen as a basic right.1

This is particularly true since freedoms are typically thought of as inhering to individuals, and so much economic activity is mediated not through individuals but through collective institutions, most notably corporations. Unfortunately Tomasi doesn’t really address the role of corporations in Free Market Fairness. For example, in the course of claiming that “many life experiences have a moral value that can only be appreciated firsthand”, Tomasi gives the (real-life) example of Amy, “a college dropout who has an entry-level job as a pet groomer” but through hard work and savings is able to own her own pet grooming business, Amy’s Pup-in-the-Tub: “What does it mean to Amy to walk into her own shop each morning or, when leaving after a particularly long day, to look back and read her name up on the sign?” (p. 66).

Clearly we can emotionally identify with Amy, just as we can identify with Mohamed Bouazizi, and like Bouazizi’s her experience supports Tomasi’s notion of individuals as responsible self-authors who should enjoy economic freedoms as a basic right. However Tomasi leaves unsaid exactly how the economic freedoms of Amy the individual relate and extend to Amy’s Pup-in-the-Tub the (presumably) incorporated business, and as with Bouazizi’s case it may be worth dissecting the relationship a bit.

Perhaps the fact of incorporation is irrelevant and, to echo Margaret Thatcher, there is no such thing as a corporation, but only individual men and women, namely Amy in this case. But this approach seems incomplete, since corporations in fact can do things that individuals cannot, such as owning property in perpetuity or taking actions without any particular individual necessarily being liable for those actions. Or perhaps corporations should be treated as persons in their own right, with their own rights to economic freedom (just as, for example, the US Supreme Court in the Citizens United decision held that corporations, unions, and other associations have First Amendment rights to free speech). If so, how does that affect Tomasi’s argument. For example, if I go down to the courthouse and register Philosophical Enterprise XLVII LLC, am I bringing a new moral agent and responsible self-author into the world?

From a moral perspective perhaps Amy’s Pup-in-the-Tub should be seen as simply a extension of Amy herself as its founder and head, just as (for example) Apple the corporation has been seen as an extension of Steve Jobs. If so, what happens when Amy sells the business to someone else (or, in the case of Apple, when Steve Jobs died and Tim Cook took over as CEO)? Are the economic freedoms of the corporation now in the service of the responsible self-authorship of the new management? What about the employees of Amy’s Pup-in-the-Tub (or of Apple)? Should their status as responsible self-authors be taken into account when considering the economic freedoms of the business employing them, or are they simply considered “factors of production” in this context? Is it specifically Amy’s role as owner of Amy’s Pub-in-the-Tub that is important—that the economic freedoms granted to a business are justified as enhancing the responsible self-authorship of its owners? What if Amy sells her business to PetSmart (NASDAQ: PETM) and ownership is dispersed among potentially millions of shareholders, many of whom may hold an ownership position for only brief periods of time?

Note that I’m not arguing that economic freedom should not be a basic right because corporations can do Bad Things. (Some of Elizabeth Anderson’s contribution to the BHL symposium reads this way.) Rather it’s just not clear to me how Tomasi’s argument based on responsible self-authorship extends from the world of individual proprietors and small businesses to the world of large publicly-traded corporations in which ownership is for the most part divorced from management, and those doing the management (especially at senior levels) amount only a small fraction of the total number of employees whose activities provide value to the firm. (Martin O’Neill and Thad Williamson make a similar point in their review of Free Market Fairness.)

Where does all this leave me in my personal thinking? Here are my tentative conclusions:

First, I agree with Tomasi that there’s a difference between believing that economic freedom is of equal importance to other freedoms and believing that economic freedom is the most important freedom, or even the only freedom that truly matters. We can be liberals (in the classic sense) without being libertarians.

Second, given (what I believe to be) the evolved and innate nature of much human morality I suspect that most people will judge economic freedom as important to the extent that it supports (or does not conflict with) other moral foundations beyond liberty/oppression, such as preventing harm or ensuring proportionality of rewards. In other words, most people are not libertarians and (in my opinion) are unlikely to ever be so. As a non-libertarian myself I don’t think we have to judge all restrictions on economic freedom as equally bad, to believe (for example) that in a modern democracy the imposition of a particular regulation or an increase in a particular tax rate carries anywhere near the moral weight of what was done to Mohamed Bouazizi.

Finally, although I think the right of people to join together in corporations and other collective organizations (e.g., unions) in pursue of economic goals is an important fundamental right, I don’t think we necessarily have to treat corporations as completely equivalent to individuals in all respects. Absent a more compelling argument (which may exist, for all I know) I think we could legitimately restrict a corporation’s freedom to act, in ways that we might not consider legitimate when applied to individuals.

What I believe we do have to do, however, is to treat economic freedoms with respect, whether we consider them basic or not, and to require reasonable justifications for government actions that would restrict them. Again, we can disagree as to what exactly “reasonable” means in this context, with different people making different arguments as to what restrictions on economic freedoms count as unacceptable. My point is simply that we cannot simply dismiss those who feel their economic freedoms are being violated in various ways, any more than we can dismiss those concerned about their political, religious, or other freedoms.

This completes my thoughts on the first of Tomasi’s core ideas of market democracy; I’ll take up the second idea, society as a spontaneous order, in my next post when (if?) I have time to write it.


1. Again, to be absolutely clear, I am not making a philosophical argument here. (Even if I wanted to make such an argument, I’m not well-versed enough in the various philosophical theories of morality and ethics to make it coherent.) Rather I’m concerned with what ordinary people might see as morally right and wrong in practice. To the extent that people engage in motivated reasoning and are predisposed to do so, even a compelling philosophical argument about morality (one based on reasonable premises and sound deductive logic) may fall on deaf ears.

Should Amazon control the .book domain, or Google .blog?

Everyone who uses the Internet knows about “.com”: google.com, disney.com, even frankhecker.com. It’s one of the well-known suffixes for Internet domain names, along with “.org” (columbiaassociation.org) and “.gov” (howardcountymd.gov); the technical term for these suffixes is “top-level domains” or TLDs. You may have also seen domain names like bit.ly and t.co, for example as used in URL shortening schemes. Here the “.ly” and “.co” are actually two letter codes for Libya and Columbia (the country, not the city). (These are known as “country code top-level domains” or ccTLDs, and are more typically used for web sites outside the U.S., like http://www.gov.uk for the UK government.) But did you know that in future there may be top-level domains like “.hilton” or “.bmw” associated with individual companies, or more generic domains like “.blog” or “.book”?

It’s the latter possibility that I want to discuss in this post. Unless you’re deeply involved in matters Internet-related you’re probably not aware that there’s a special organization, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) that’s responsible for (among other things) the structure of Internet domain names, including overseeing the organizations that sell domain names and deciding which top-level domains can be used. For some time now ICANN has been expanding the set of top-level domains. Some of these, like .biz, were created to provide an alternative for people who can’t get their preferred .com domain name; others, like .museum, were intended for use by particular types of organizations. (See Wikipedia for the complete list of so-called generic TLDs.)

ICANN is now going through another round of creating new top-level domains, with the aforementioned .blog and .book only two of the almost two thousand (!) possibilities being considered. At first glance this sounds pretty neat: I publish a blog, so I might be interested in having frankhecker.blog; similarly, I’ve published a book, Dividing Howard (shameless plug: all royalties go to the charity Voices for Children), so I might also be interested in having dividinghoward.book. However, .blog and .book are different from current TLDs like .com or .biz; as currently proposed they may not be open to the general public, but instead could be completely controlled by specific companies for their own use, in this case Google for .blog and Amazon for .book. (More correctly, .blog and .book would be controlled by someone; other companies are applying for .blog and book as well, and the right to control these TLDs could end up being auctioned off to the highest bidder.)

So, for example, Dennis “Wordbones” Lane hosts his “Tales of Two Cities” blog on Google’s Blogger service; if Google is able to go through with its plans then Dennis would be able to have his blog available at talesoftwocities.blog. On the other hand I host my blog with WordPress.com, so frankhecker.blog would be unavailable to me. Of course, if Dennis did use talesoftwocities.blog and became unhappy with Google’s blogging platform, he’d be out of luck; he’d have to put up with Google or find a new domain name.

Similarly, if Amazon gets its way I might be able to have the domain dividinghoward.book go straight to the Amazon page for Dividing Howard, which would certainly be convenient. But the book’s available on Barnes and Noble’s web site as well; I doubt that Amazon’s terms of service would allow me to link to bn.com from dividinghoward.book or otherwise promote non-Amazon outlets for the book. I also doubt that libraries, publishers, or others would be allowed to have .book domain names except at the pleasure of Amazon.

Needless to say, these proposed types of top-level domains (known as closed generic TLDs) are a bit controversial, at least among the relatively small group of people who follow these sorts of things; see for example this cNet story from last year that talks about Amazon’s “power play” in attempting to obtain dozens of generic top-level domains for itself. One common-sense objection makes the analogy to trademarks: Here in the U.S. at least you can’t get a trademark for a generic term; thus, for example, Amazon would never be in a position to tell an independent bookstore that it couldn’t use the word “book” in its name. A counter-argument is that the system of top-level domain names is not analogous to trademarks, and that little or no harm would ensure if Amazon or anyone else got exclusive control of a top-level domain like .book.

Why am I telling you all this now? Because ICANN is currently soliciting public comments on the proposal to allow .book and other closed generic TLDs, and the comment period closes in less than three days (at 7 pm on Thursday, March 7). This issue has been under the radar for the most part, without much public awareness; I wasn’t aware of it until recently, and I happen to work for a company that’s intimately involved in the technical infrastructure of the Internet Domain Name System.

If your opinion is especially strong one way or the other feel free to also write your congressional representative. ICANN ultimately acts only at the pleasure of the U.S. government, which controls it both directly (ICANN is under contract to the Department of Commerce) and indirectly (the U.S. government retains ultimately control of the technical infrastructure that would enable new TLDs like .book to work). But time is short. If you have an opinion on this matter, let them know!

P.S. For more information on the background to all of this, see the ICANN site or the independent newgtldsite.com.

Martin O’Malley has his eyes on the prize and off the ball

I don’t usually comment on Maryland politics beyond Howard County, but this Washington Post story on Martin O’Malley’s approval rating reinforces an opinion I’ve held for a while: O’Malley seems to be frittering away his second term trying to make himself into a national figure, as opposed to actually doing the hard work of preparing Maryland for success in the 21st century. Maybe this is an unfair characterization; maybe (as with the college tuition and school funding issues mentioned in the article) he’s just had a problem “communicating his accomplishments”.

But it’s a simple fact that the public has a limited attention span, and they can be forgiven for thinking that O’Malley’s top priorities right now are things like gun control and repealing the death penalty, given that those have been most in the news with his name attached. I doubt that either of these issues is on the average voter’s top 10 list of critical problems facing Maryland, and so I’m not surprised that voters are lukewarm in their feelings about O’Malley.

The simple fact is that Maryland voters have no desire to see Martin O’Malley run for president in 2016, and nobody else does either. So why spend the next few years polishing his liberal credentials for the benefit of Democratic activists and primary voters? Why not spend the time building a reputation as someone willing to take on hard long-term issues, like growing Maryland’s economy in the coming age of Federal austerity, ensuring that Maryland’s health care system works well as implementation of the Affordable Care Act goes into high gear, and putting the state on a sound financial footing without resorting to excessive taxes or gimmicks like casino expansion?

Unlike Barack Obama, O’Malley doesn’t have the excuse of facing an implacable Republican opposition capable of blocking his political agenda. If a Democratic governor can’t be effective in Maryland, where can they be effective? And though as a registered Democrat it pains me to say this, right now I’d count both Robert McDonnell in Virginia and Chris Christie in New Jersey (plus Andrew Cuomo on the Democratic side in New York) as doing a better job of actually governing their states than Martin O’Malley.